by MLC | Mar 12, 2016 | Martial Law Stories
By: Ryan Macasero
Source: Rappler.com
‘Don’t forget the dark days,’ Romulus Dingcong tells young Filipinos, as he and fellow surviving martial law victims campaign against vice presidential candidate Bongbong Marcos
NEVER AGAIN. Romulus ‘Og’ Dingcong, 63, tells Cebuanos how he was detained and tortured during martial law. Photo courtesy of Doris Mongaya
CEBU CITY, Philippines – Some millennials on social media praise the “glory days” of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos, who served from 1965 to 1986.
They yearn for the return of discipline and “strongman” rule to a country that has yet to rise above endemic corruption and poverty. The 1986 EDSA Revolution was a fluke and “things were better those days,” they argue.
Marcos’ son, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr, won a seat in the Senate in 2010, and is gunning for higher office in May. Those who suffered human rights abuses under the Marcos regime are alarmed by the latest surveys showing him sharing the lead with Senator Francis Escudero in the vice presidential race.
Their concern stemmed from the statements the vice presidential candidate had made in response to questions about the atrocities committed during his father’s regime.
When asked by a reporter if he should say sorry for his father’s mistakes, the senator replied: “Will I say sorry for the thousands and thousands of kilometers [of roads] that were built? Will I say sorry for the agricultural policy that brought us to self-sufficiency in rice? Will I say sorry for the power generation? Will I say sorry for the highest literacy rate in Asia? What am I to say sorry about?” (READ: Marcos on dad’s regime: What am I to apologize for?)
When President Benigno Aquino III said that the Marcoses should apologize for the human rights abuses during martial law, the senator said it is Aquino who should move on.
Scarred for life
But for Romulus Dingcong, 63, “moving on” is not an option – even if he wanted to.
That’s why he and other members of Selda, a coalition of surviving martial law victims in the Philippines, are campaigning against Marcos’ bid for the vice presidency.
“Ang pamilyang Marcos, sa ilang dugo, naa ang pag-abuso (Abuse is in the blood of the Marcos family),” Dingcong said.
The group recently launched a campaign in Cebu where it plans to hold counter demonstrations and other activities to try to derail Marcos’ bid. Dingcong told Rappler his story at the sidelines of one of Selda’s events in this city.
He was arrested in 1974, two years after martial law was declared.
It is now 2016, but he still remembers every painful detail.
“Ang akong nahinumduman, kadtong pagtorture nako (I can still remember being tortured),” he told Rappler. (READ: QUIZ: Would you have survived martial law?)
Dingcong was an 18-year-old student activist at Colegio San Agustin in Bacolod when he was arrested.
”Ila kong gikolata. Gigamit pud nila ang butt sa armalite (They beat me. They also used the butt of an armalite to beat me),” Dingcong recalled.
The beatings led to lung injuries and pain in his ribs which he still suffers from today. (READ: Worse than death: Torture methods during martial law)
Dingcong was tortured for a month at a military camp before he was transferred to the Philippine Constabulary headquarters in Bacolod City. “Sometimes they would interrogate, other times they just enjoy beating me,” he said in Visayan.
He was detained for over 3 years. His sentence was extended a few times after being accused of plotting to escape.
Sometimes the soldiers would threaten to kill him in prison, but he was eventually released in Cebu. His release was conditional and he was not allowed to return to Negros.
“Even after I left the prison, I was constantly monitored. They wanted to make sure I wasn’t going to join the rebellion or get involved again with the activists,” he said.
Upon release, the Redemptorist Church took him in and allowed him to stay at the seminary while he was looking for a job.
But even the church was no refuge for Dingcong.
“Gibadlung sila kay hadluk sila basin ma-influence ang mga seminarista (They scolded the priests for letting us stay because they were afraid the seminarians would be influenced),” Dingcong said.
After his release, Dingcong eventually got married and settled in Cebu City.
‘Don’t forget’
Although the Marcoses were forced to leave Malacañang following the EDSA Revolution, Dingcong recognizes that the Philippines has yet to achieve full economic and social justice. “Samut kadaghan og corrupt sa Pilipinas (There are even more corrupt in the Philippines now),” he said.
But he has no doubt that putting a Marcos back in office would not be the answer, as the late strongman’s children have not recognized his wrongdoings.
“Sa iyang anak karun, ang problema, kay dili mo angkon sa sala sa iyang amahan. Dili siya angayan ibalik sa Malacañang (The problem is his children don’t want to admit the wrongdoings of their father. Bongbong’s not fit for Malacañang),” Dingcong said.
He cautioned the youth: “Dapat i-open ilang mind unsa atong naagi adtong martial law (They should really open their minds to what happened during martial law).“
“Wala pa gani nato nadawat ang award para sa mga human rights victims (We haven’t even received the award for human rights victims),” he added.
Dingcong also said, “Ug wala pud ta kahibalo kung mamatay ang presidente na lansaron (ni Imelda) iyang anak pagkapresidente (We also don’t know if Imelda is pushing him to become president if the sitting president would die).”
With Bongbong’s numbers rising in the surveys, is it too late now to derail his campaign? Dingcong said he would not let even his age stop him from trying.
This election, he wants to tell the youth, “Ayaw’g kalimti mga ngitngit nga panahon (Don’t forget the dark days).” – Rappler.com
by MLC | Mar 8, 2016 | Martial Law Stories
Source: Rappler.com
The PCGG-OSG argues in its Motion for Summary Judgment that the value of Marcos family’s art collection surpasses the combined legal income of then-President Ferdinand Marcos and former First Lady Imelda Marcos from 1966-1986
MANILA, Philippines – Lawyers with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) requested on Tuesday, March 8, that the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan decide on the ownership of three collections of paintings and other art pieces the State is trying to get back from the Marcoses.
The PCGG-OSG argued in its 113-page Motion for Summary Judgment that the value of Marcos family’s art collection surpassed the combined legal income of then-President Ferdinand Marcos and former First Lady Imelda Marcos.
The value of the art collection at the time of acquisition was $24 million, a value disproportionate to the family’s income from 1966 to 1986, which Supreme Court calculations pegged at $304,372.43. (READ: At 30: PCGG by the numbers)
Government lawyers had 3 lists with their motion. The first list identified 152 paintings carrying an estimated $11.84 million in value. The second list had 27 paintings and sculptures – reportedly found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila – with an assessed value of $548,445.48.
Twelve paintings by Anna Mary Robertson – also known as the Grandma Moses collection – was also said to have been bought for $372,000.
The lawyers went on to say, “Without doubt, the subject paintings must be forfeited; in the same manner that the Supreme Court forfeited that funds and assets (of the Marcoses), for being patently disproportionate to the respondent spouses’ aggregate legitimate income.” (READ: Recovering Marcos’ ill-gotten wealth: After 30 years, what?)
The government has previously used motions for summary judgment to win ill-gotten wealth cases against the Marcoses and their associates, including several sub-divisions of Civil Case No. 0033, which deals with the coconut levy cases.
Motions for summary judgment petition the court to resolve pending disputes based on evidence already on record, which can include submissions of the parties in pleadings already filed.
While motions for summary judgment can do away with lengthy trials, the risk involved include the possibility that the court could declare the evidence at hand to be insufficient to support the government’s claim.
The PCGG-OSG, however, cited previously relied-upon grounds it has used to win some earlier battles, including winning the forfeiture of $683 million in cash deposits from the Marcos family’s Swiss foundations, the $40 million in funds in the Arelma account, as well as 3 of Imelda Marcos’ jewelry collections.
The PCGG-OSG cited the instant Petition for Forfeiture filed under Republic Act No 1379, which they said “had already established the scandalous acquisition of ill-gotten wealth by the Marcoses, their acquisition of lands, buildings, condominium units, mansions, business interests, jewelry, and other real or personal property.”
Back in September 29, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued a writ of attachment. This authorized court officers to seize 15 paintings found at the old Marcos home in San Juan.
An additional 9 pieces of art were later found by Sandiganbayan sheriff Romulo Barrozo at Rep. Marcos’ office in the Batasan Complex. Court officers, however, were kept by Congress security from recovering the paintings.
The PCGG-OSG asked the court in its motion for summary judgment to declare the paintings as “unlawfully acquired” so they could be forfeited in favor of the State.
The motion for summary judgment also sought for a court directive to be issued barring the marcoses from disposing of the artworks.
This directive would also entail the surrender of all identified paintings, the listing of the paintings’ location, and the authorization of of court officers and police to “seize and secure” those assets. – Rappler.com
by MLC | Feb 26, 2016 | Martial Law Stories
By: Ronald U. Mendoza
Source: Rappler.com
Perhaps young voters today cannot be faulted for failing to see the economic and political folly of a dictatorship. This article is meant to reach out to them.
Perhaps the only thing worse than a natural disaster is a man-made one, often borne of misguided policies that favor a few entrenched interests, while placing most of the risk and cost of failure on the broad population.
Add human rights abuses and a complete monopolization of political power and you have the ingredients for an economic and political implosion.
Drawing on the available evidence, the economic disaster that began in the late 1970s and ultimately helped to end the Marcos dictatorship in 1986 is one glaring exa
mple of what a man-made disaster looks like.
At the time, the country’s top economists, the majority of the business community, the perhaps millions of Filipinos voting with their feet to leave the country, and indeed the international community all recognized the role of the Marcos dictatorship in the disaster that would ensue.
Perhaps young voters today cannot be faulted for failing to see in full the economic and political folly of a dictatorship. This article is meant to reach out to them, in an attempt to clarify – using evidence – the true economic record of the Marcos dictatorship.
Sick man of Asia
Decades of policy experience and evidence in international economic development policy suggest that countries succeed if they get (at least) two things right:
- They put in place the right policies and institutions such as those that spur investments, strengthen government accountability and empower citizens;
- They successfully convince the majority of the population (and also unify much of the government bureaucracy) in a single-minded quest to develop and industrialize.
Examples of East Asian tiger economies such as Indonesia and Malaysia show what effective economic development policies combined with able leadership and a united citizenry look like. Between the 1960s and the present, Indonesia’s real GDP per capita (in 2005 US dollars) increased around six-fold, while Malaysia’s increased by roughly seven-fold.
And while both countries experienced economic challenges during the Asian financial crisis of the mid-1990s, Malaysia recovered its pre-crisis GDP per capita after 3 years and Indonesia after 7 years, promptly returning to its upward trajectory afterwards
Make no mistake: Malaysia and Indonesia (like many other Asian tiger economies) also produced authoritarian leaders. But political scientists and development researchers contend that in these countries, there was still a general inclination to preserve legitimate political regimes in large part through inclusive economic development.
The Philippine experience is a study in contrast to these tiger economies.
First of all, the country only managed around a two-fold increase in its real GDP per capita between the 1960s and the present. The bulk of the story behind this lies in the economic meltdown during the tail-end of the Marcos years, coupled with a long road to recovery by the “sick man of Asia”.
And unlike Indonesia and Malaysia that managed to bounce back from their respective crises in only a few years, the Philippines languished below its pre-crisis income level for around 2 decades, recovering its real GDP per capita in 1982 only in 2004.
Figure 1. Philippine Real GDP Per Capita (2005 US dollars), 1960-2012. 
What went wrong?
Put succinctly, some of the country’s top economists have characterized the Marcos years as being fueled by “debt-driven growth.”
Debt is not necessarily detrimental to a country’s economic growth and development, when managed well and invested judiciously – notably in areas that allow the country to grow faster and include more of its citizens as beneficiaries and drivers of that inclusive growth.
Indonesia and Malaysia managed to do this. Both countries reduced poverty during their industrialization periods. Indonesia started with 70% poverty incidence in 1970s, driving this down to a mere 15% by the 1990s and further to around 11% in 2013.
Malaysia also managed to reduce its 50% poverty incidence in the 1960s to less than 1% today. These economic results helped to legitimize their political regimes—a form of accountability that political scientists and development researchers attribute to the Asian tiger economies.
Philippine poverty, on the other hand, increased during the Marcos years, rising from 41% poverty incidence around the time Marcos took the Presidency in the 1960s to around 59% by the time he was kicked out by a popular people-power revolution in the 1980s.
And during this time, as much of the country was impoverished, the country’s external debt grew by an annual average rate of 25% from 1970 to 1981.
Failures of economic management
If there was so much money flowing into the country, then why did poverty continue to increase?
An influential think piece written in 1984 by Noel De Dios, Vic Paqueo, Solita Monsod and other top economic minds of the country then, outlined the many failures of economic management during the Marcos years.
State-run monopolies, mismanaged exchange rates, imprudent monetary policy and debt management, all underpinned by rampant corruption and cronyism, were among the key factors that plunged the Philippine economy into the worst economic contraction that it has experienced in its entire history.
For at least a while, such was the authoritarian control of the dictator that many of the excesses in the form of captured and corrupted state policies were unchecked.
Such was the centralization of power and impunity that there was little inclination to preserve the legitimacy of the regime by reducing poverty and inequality. Far from it.
De dios et al. observed that the “[…]main characteristics distinguishing the Marcos years from other periods of our history has been the trend towards the concentration of power in the hands of the government, and the use of governmental functions to dispense economic privileges to some small factions in the private sector.”
As regards the much vaunted infrastructure spending during those years, they further added that “[…]the bulk of construction and other capital outlays in both the private and public sectors were not very productive and many were outrightly wasteful.”
And in lieu of a strong developmental rationale, they further observed that “[…]a more urgent reason for pursuing them was the opportunity to use government activity as a vehicle for private gain, whether pecuniary or political. Examples would be overdesigned bridges, highways, public buildings or large energy projects designed to secure a political constituency, to get a commission, or to corner a contract.”
White elephants
There are few more palpable and glaring examples of the economic mismanagement of the time than the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) located in Morong, Bataan.
Started in the 1970s, the BNPP was supposed to boost the country’s competitiveness by providing affordable electricity to fuel industrialization and job creation in the country.
Far from this, the US$2.3 billion nuclear plant suffered from cost over-runs and engineering and structural issues which eventually led to its mothballing—without generating a single watt of electricity.
Corruption charges were later filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government against Marcos crony, Herminio Disini, whose wife is the first cousin of first lady Imelda Marcos, and whose firm served to usher the BNPP deal.
Westinghouse, the US company that supplied the BNPP, later testified in a US court that they paid Disini over US$17 million to help acquire insurance, telecommunications and civil works subcontracts for the BNPP without competitive bidding.
Disini’s cousin, Jesus Disini, also admitted to the same court that President Marcos himself received part of this pay-off because he was co-owner of the group of companies headed by Herminio Disini. Until today, the BNPP case remains unresolved. (READ: Search for Marcos wealth: Compromising with Marcos cronies)
At its peak, the debt payments for the BNPP reached, on average, US$150,000 per day. The country finally paid the debt for the BNPP in 2007. The resources funnelled into this project could have funded over 40,000 classrooms to educate almost 2 million Filipino children, or three squadrons of FA-50 aircraft to help defend Philippine sovereignty, or account for half the cost of a high speed rail connecting Clark and Manila. This single corruption-laden project alone robbed the country of these worthier investments.
Worse yet, the rent-seeking and corrupt environment that produced the BNPP and many other white elephant projects during those times signalled an erosion of many key institutions that would take decades to recover.
Post-Marcos economy
The very things that signal the Philippine economy’s competitiveness today – an independent central bank, an effective fiscal and treasury management system, strong checks-and-balances built into public procurement and public-private-partnership (PPP) tenders, increased competition introduced to once-monopolized economic sectors, stronger oversight over government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), among many others – are among the very areas that differentiate the Philippine economy today with the Marcos-era economy.
Yet, persistent poverty and high inequality, along with the rise of many “mini-dictatorships” by political families across the archipelago provide a strong reminder that much work still needs to be done.
And no single president or administration has the political capital to put together all the reforms all at once. One can quibble about how many more reforms this or that administration should have been able to put in place, or could take credit for having achieved them.
In truth, all good economic outcomes are produced and sustained by many presidents. Yet one thing is clear: a government that went about undermining the very foundations for growth, development and democracy should be easy to spot.
To call the Marcos economy superior to our economy today simply flies in the face of economic history and empirical evidence. Returning the reins of power to a dictator (or to leaders who belittle the damage caused by dictators like Marcos) in order to somehow hasten economic and political reforms? That would be the greatest irony of them all. – Rappler.com
by MLC | Feb 26, 2016 | Martial Law Stories
By: Patty Pasion
Source: Rappler.com
Does the son and namesake of the late dictator see martial law happening again? ‘Oh, God, no. If there is martial law, it means we are in crisis.’
WINNING PANGASINAN. Vice Presidential Candidate Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. during his campaign sortie at Umingan Pangasinan on Friday, Feb. 26, 2016. Photo by Jasmin Dulay
MANILA, Philippines – A day after the 30th anniversary of the EDSA People Power Revolution that ousted his father, Senator Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr, said he does not want to see another episode of military rule in the country.
Marcos was out of the public eye on Thursday, February 25, when the nation commemorated the the 1986 bloodless revolution that unseated dictator Ferdinand Marcos. During a program at the EDSA Shrine, President Benigno Aquino III said that if Marcos Jr is unapologetic for the atrocities committed during martial, then there is danger of him repeating them.
On Friday, February 26 – the 4th time Marcos visited vote-rich Pangasinan since the campaign started – reporters pressed the vice presidential candidate on whether he sees martial law happening again in the Philippines.
“Oh, God, no. If there is martial law, it means we are in crisis. We don’t want the Philippines to be in crisis,” Marcos said.
Marcos previously dismissed the idea of issuing an apology to victims of human rights abuses during martial law. He had said that the country benefitted from the projects his parents initiated in their 20 years in power.
What is there to fear?
Marcos also addressed fears on the repercussions of their family’s return to power, which was highlighted by President Benigno Aquino III in his speech during the EDSA anniversary celebration on Thursday.
“Ano namang ikakatakot dito sa amin eh mabait naman tayong lahat. Wala naman tayong ginagawa na may sinasaktan, na may ganyang klaseng pangyayari,” he defended.
(What is there to fear about us? We are all good-willed people. We are not doing anything to hurt others, no such circumstances.)
Human rights watchdog Amnesty International has estimated that 70,000 people were imprisoned, 34,000 tortured, and 3,240 killed during the time of Marcos’ father.
A coalition of martial law victims, composed of at least 800 people from across the country, has vowed to counter Marcos Jr’s vice presidential bid to prevent the Marcoses from returning to Malacañang.
Selective justice
A survey front runner in the vice presidential race, Marcos was also asked on Friday whether he would abolish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) should he be elected into office.
The PCGG was created by President Corazon Aquino in 1986 to seize the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
“Not necessarily but, again, let’s not do selective justice,” he told reporters. Marcos previously criticized the commission’s intensified search for their alleged remaining illegally acquired properties as “politicking” now that he is running for a top post.
“Huwag lang isang pamilya ang hinahabol (Don’t just run after one family). PCGG was established for good government,” he said.
PCGG launched a website in February to aid their search for the high-valued paintings owned by the Marcoses. It also announced its plans to auction off the jewelries of former First lady Imelda Marcos.
In a two-part series, Rappler explores the government policies and PCGG compromises that have prolonged the recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth.
– Rappler.com
by MLC | Feb 26, 2016 | Martial Law Stories
By Ronald U. Mendoza
Source: Rappler.com
Perhaps young voters today cannot be faulted for failing to see the economic and political folly of a dictatorship. This article is meant to reach out to them.
Perhaps the only thing worse than a natural disaster is a man-made one, often borne of misguided policies that favor a few entrenched interests, while placing most of the risk and cost of failure on the broad population.
Add human rights abuses and a complete monopolization of political power and you have the ingredients for an economic and political implosion.
Drawing on the available evidence, the economic disaster that began in the late 1970s and ultimately helped to end the Marcos dictatorship in 1986 is one glaring example of what a man-made disaster looks like.
At the time, the country’s top economists, the majority of the business community, the perhaps millions of Filipinos voting with their feet to leave the country, and indeed the international community all recognized the role of the Marcos dictatorship in the disaster that would ensue.
Perhaps young voters today cannot be faulted for failing to see in full the economic and political folly of a dictatorship. This article is meant to reach out to them, in an attempt to clarify – using evidence – the true economic record of the Marcos dictatorship.
Sick man of Asia
Decades of policy experience and evidence in international economic development policy suggest that countries succeed if they get (at least) two things right:
- They put in place the right policies and institutions such as those that spur investments, strengthen government accountability and empower citizens;
- They successfully convince the majority of the population (and also unify much of the government bureaucracy) in a single-minded quest to develop and industrialize.
Examples of East Asian tiger economies such as Indonesia and Malaysia show what effective economic development policies combined with able leadership and a united citizenry look like. Between the 1960s and the present, Indonesia’s real GDP per capita (in 2005 US dollars) increased around six-fold, while Malaysia’s increased by roughly seven-fold. And while both countries experienced economic challenges during the Asian financial crisis of the mid-1990s, Malaysia recovered its pre-crisis GDP per capita after 3 years and Indonesia after 7 years, promptly returning to its upward trajectory afterwards
Make no mistake: Malaysia and Indonesia (like many other Asian tiger economies) also produced authoritarian leaders. But political scientists and development researchers contend that in these countries, there was still a general inclination to preserve legitimate political regimes in large part through inclusive economic development.
The Philippine experience is a study in contrast to these tiger economies.
First of all, the country only managed around a two-fold increase in its real GDP per capita between the 1960s and the present. The bulk of the story behind this lies in the economic meltdown during the tail-end of the Marcos years, coupled with a long road to recovery by the “sick man of Asia”.
And unlike Indonesia and Malaysia that managed to bounce back from their respective crises in only a few years, the Philippines languished below its pre-crisis income level for around 2 decades, recovering its real GDP per capita in 1982 only in 2004.
Figure 1. Philippine Real GDP Per Capita (2005 US dollars), 1960-2012.
Source: Author using data obtained from the World Development Indicators.
What went wrong?
Put succinctly, some of the country’s top economists have characterized the Marcos years as being fueled by “debt-driven growth.”
Debt is not necessarily detrimental to a country’s economic growth and development, when managed well and invested judiciously – notably in areas that allow the country to grow faster and include more of its citizens as beneficiaries and drivers of that inclusive growth.
Indonesia and Malaysia managed to do this. Both countries reduced poverty during their industrialization periods. Indonesia started with 70% poverty incidence in 1970s, driving this down to a mere 15% by the 1990s and further to around 11% in 2013. Malaysia also managed to reduce its 50% poverty incidence in the 1960s to less than 1% today. These economic results helped to legitimize their political regimes—a form of accountability that political scientists and development researchers attribute to the Asian tiger economies.
Philippine poverty, on the other hand, increased during the Marcos years, rising from 41% poverty incidence around the time Marcos took the Presidency in the 1960s to around 59% by the time he was kicked out by a popular people-power revolution in the 1980s. And during this time, as much of the country was impoverished, the country’s external debt grew by an annual average rate of 25% from 1970 to 1981.
Failures of economic management
If there was so much money flowing into the country, then why did poverty continue to increase?
An influential think piece written in 1984 by Noel De Dios, Vic Paqueo, Solita Monsod and other top economic minds of the country then, outlined the many failures of economic management during the Marcos years.
State-run monopolies, mismanaged exchange rates, imprudent monetary policy and debt management, all underpinned by rampant corruption and cronyism, were among the key factors that plunged the Philippine economy into the worst economic contraction that it has experienced in its entire history.
For at least a while, such was the authoritarian control of the dictator that many of the excesses in the form of captured and corrupted state policies were unchecked. Such was the centralization of power and impunity that there was little inclination to preserve the legitimacy of the regime by reducing poverty and inequality. Far from it.
De dios et al. observed that the “[…]main characteristics distinguishing the Marcos years from other periods of our history has been the trend towards the concentration of power in the hands of the government, and the use of governmental functions to dispense economic privileges to some small factions in the private sector.”
As regards the much vaunted infrastructure spending during those years, they further added that “[…]the bulk of construction and other capital outlays in both the private and public sectors were not very productive and many were outrightly wasteful.”
And in lieu of a strong developmental rationale, they further observed that “[…]a more urgent reason for pursuing them was the opportunity to use government activity as a vehicle for private gain, whether pecuniary or political. Examples would be overdesigned bridges, highways, public buildings or large energy projects designed to secure a political constituency, to get a commission, or to corner a contract.”
ECONOMIC DISASTER. Ferdinand Marcos at the height of protests against him. File photo by AFP
White elephants
There are few more palpable and glaring examples of the economic mismanagement of the time than the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) located in Morong, Bataan. Started in the 1970s, the BNPP was supposed to boost the country’s competitiveness by providing affordable electricity to fuel industrialization and job creation in the country. Far from this, the US$2.3 billion nuclear plant suffered from cost over-runs and engineering and structural issues which eventually led to its mothballing—without generating a single watt of electricity.
Corruption charges were later filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government against Marcos crony, Herminio Disini, whose wife is the first cousin of first lady Imelda Marcos, and whose firm served to usher the BNPP deal. Westinghouse, the US company that supplied the BNPP, later testified in a US court that they paid Disini over US$17 million to help acquire insurance, telecommunications and civil works subcontracts for the BNPP without competitive bidding. Disini’s cousin, Jesus Disini, also admitted to the same court that President Marcos himself received part of this pay-off because he was co-owner of the group of companies headed by Herminio Disini. Until today, the BNPP case remains unresolved. (READ: Search for Marcos wealth: Compromising with Marcos cronies)
At its peak, the debt payments for the BNPP reached, on average, US$150,000 per day. The country finally paid the debt for the BNPP in 2007. The resources funnelled into this project could have funded over 40,000 classrooms to educate almost 2 million Filipino children, or three squadrons of FA-50 aircraft to help defend Philippine sovereignty, or account for half the cost of a high speed rail connecting Clark and Manila. This single corruption-laden project alone robbed the country of these worthier investments.
Worse yet, the rent-seeking and corrupt environment that produced the BNPP and many other white elephant projects during those times signalled an erosion of many key institutions that would take decades to recover.
Post-Marcos economy
The very things that signal the Philippine economy’s competitiveness today – an independent central bank, an effective fiscal and treasury management system, strong checks-and-balances built into public procurement and public-private-partnership (PPP) tenders, increased competition introduced to once-monopolized economic sectors, stronger oversight over government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), among many others – are among the very areas that differentiate the Philippine economy today with the Marcos-era economy.
Yet, persistent poverty and high inequality, along with the rise of many “mini-dictatorships” by political families across the archipelago provide a strong reminder that much work still needs to be done.
And no single president or administration has the political capital to put together all the reforms all at once. One can quibble about how many more reforms this or that administration should have been able to put in place, or could take credit for having achieved them.
In truth, all good economic outcomes are produced and sustained by many presidents. Yet one thing is clear: a government that went about undermining the very foundations for growth, development and democracy should be easy to spot.
To call the Marcos economy superior to our economy today simply flies in the face of economic history and empirical evidence. Returning the reins of power to a dictator (or to leaders who belittle the damage caused by dictators like Marcos) in order to somehow hasten economic and political reforms? That would be the greatest irony of them all.
The author is an economist and a martial law baby. He thanks Jerome Abesamis, Edsel Beja, Monica Melchor, Dave Timbermann and Benjie Tolosa for their inputs and advice on this article.
by MLC | Feb 25, 2016 | Martial Law Stories
By Philip M. Lustre Jr.
Source: Rappler.com
The irony – or tragedy – is that despite overwhelming evidence against them, not one of the Marcoses and their cronies had spent a day in prison for plundering the nation
MANILA, Philippines – The figures look staggering and impressive.
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), tasked to recover the ill-gotten wealth of dictator Ferdinand Marcos, his family, and cronies, has recovered over the last 30 years at least P170 billion (nearly $3.6 billion) in cash, despite working on an overall budget of P2.9 billion ($61 million) over the same period.
Various estimates put the total Marcos loot at between $5 billion to $10 billion, however.
The total recovery efforts could reach over P200 billion ($4.2 billion), as the PCGG winds up its task and sells the remaining illegally acquired assets in its possession and recover some more illegal assets in civil cases pending in various courts.
But it’s been a period of false starts and dead ends, cloak-and-dagger operations, and, ultimately, successes, failures, and the ubiquitous feelings of frustration, helplessness, and powerless among the people tasked to do the job.
The illegal asset recovery program has been problematic, both in the way it was thought out and how it was implemented.
Following are the key concerns:
- Inconsistency in strategy. Because it did not have a template to work on, the government committed various hit-and-misses in its strategy to recover Marcos’ ill-gotten wealth. This was exacerbated by changes in post-EDSA administrations.
- Burden of legal processes. Anchored on the spirit of a democratic system, the recovery efforts had to adhere to strictly legal processes, that often proved cumbersome. To this day, the anti-graft court Sandiganbayan is still hearing recovery cases on the properties of Marcos and his cronies.
- ‘Doves’ and ‘Hawks’. Following Cory Aquino’s two executive orders on how to recover ill-gotten wealth, factions in her Cabinet shared opposing approaches to the problem. One group pushed for the immediate sequestration of ill-gotten properties and file appropriate charges in court. Another wanted to negotiate with Marcos cronies for an out-of-court settlement. One more group planned unconventional attempts to recover Marcos’ bank deposits, among them the botched “Operation Big Bird.”
Does crime pay?
The irony – or tragedy – is that not one of the Marcoses and their cronies had spent a day in prison for plundering the Filipino nation.
Despite the overwhelming pieces of evidence showing the Marcoses and their cronies’ participation and complicity in the unparalleled raid of the national treasury and the subsequent transfers of their loot elsewhere, the post-Marcos administrations have hardly succeeded to bring any of them before the bar of justice.
The lesson in history seems to be that crime pays. When one steals, he has to steal big to buy his freedom. Indeed, the issue ill-gotten has yet to reach an acceptable closure after 30 years.
It is said that the post-EDSA Revolution administrations, except Corazon Aquino’s, are hardly serious in running after the plunderers. Proof: Except for the dictator, who died in 1989, the Marcoses are back in power.
LEFT BEHIND. The Marcos family leaves behind documents and personal belongings in Malacañang. Photo from the Presidential Museum and Library
Son Ferdinand Jr. is now a senator and running for vice president in the May 9 presidential polls. Daughter Imee is now the Ilocos Norte governor. Wife Imelda is a lawmaker representing Ilocos Norte’s 2nd district.
They do not live on bended knees, as what scions of dictators do. They wield influence along the corridors of power. They are back with vengeance, as if to mock the restored democracy.
They are revising history, using the loot to rewrite and reinterpret what had transpired during the martial law days. (READ: Bongbong Marcos: EDSA disrupted Marcos’ plans for PH)
The scuttlebutt is that the Marcos loot is so big that it would take many decades to recover them. Besides, they have successfully hidden an undetermined amount of the illegal wealth to empower them to stage a political comeback. They have done their comeback with flying colors.
Destabilized regime
Both Bautista and Amurao acknowledged that the overall recovery efforts have been anchored within the spirit and parameters of the democratic system, which the Cory Aquino government had sought to rekindle, restore, and reinvigorate immediately the EDSA Revolution.
Hence, the PCGG has largely stuck to the legal processes in their search for the hidden Marcos loot.
“Please remember that we did not have a template to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and cronies,” Amurao said. “It was a mandate imposed on us by the Filipino people in the EDSA Revolution.”
In the august hall of the Senate, Rene Saguisag, then a senator, used to say that the failure to go after and jail the plunderers and cronies stemmed from the inherent weakness of the Cory Aquino government.
It was a fledgling government threatened by military mutinies and political destabilization.
“We did not even know if we would be around by tomorrow,” Saguisag said with an intense feeling of exasperation, as he recalled the government’s exercises of brinkmanship to survive the debilitating onslaughts of coups and destabilization campaigns. It was an open admission of the limitation of the first post-EDSA government that conceived and pursued the recovery efforts.
Martial law and failed promises
After declaring martial law in 1972, Ferdinand Marcos, who was first elected in 1965, ruled for another 13 years. But the promised changes did not happen. Instead, he created the following legacy:
- Centralized corruption, where he earned fat under-the-table commissions from big-ticket state projects and deposited the illicit proceeds in various foreign banks, mostly in Switzerland and Liechtenstein, which serves mainly as a tax haven;
- Crony capitalism, where his stable of cronies replaced the pre-martial law oligarchs, cornering fat state projects, forming monopolies in the coconut and sugar industries, obtaining special import privileges in select industries in the manufacturing sector, and grabbing monopoly contracts in the services sector, which included the waterfront; and
- Unrestrained and wanton human rights violations, where tens of thousands of student activists, religious workers, and other anti-Marcos Filipinos were arrested and imprisoned without charges, released without any explanation, tortured, and summarily executed, and disappeared without any trace.
Although the first 4 or 5 years brought about sustained economic growth, Marcos ruled without mandate, triggering widespread criticism in the domestic front and the international community. He was not popularly elected beyond 1973, but held several rigged referenda to reflect ostensibly the people’s approval of his martial law regime.
Marcos, Imelda and their cronies, which constituted the martial law-sponsored new oligarchy, were behind what is plain and simple kleptocracy, or the use of power and state structures to plunder and accumulate wealth and enable them to live like kings and queens even for 20 lifetimes.
Former Senate President Jovito Salonga, the first PCGG chair, estimated their total loot at between $5 billion to $10 billion. After 30 years, the estimate stands. Even the international community accepts these figures.
1986: Game-changing revolution
The four-day EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 was the game-changing political upheaval that led to the determination of the scope and extent of the illegal wealth the Marcoses and their cronies had acquired and stashed here and abroad.
Marcos left many documents in Malacañang and these documents revealed the paper trail of an intricate web of corruption that led to their accumulation of illicit wealth. The paper trail has led to the discovery and identification, although not all, of the illegally acquired wealth and the dynamics of corruption.
Hence, the first order of the day for the administration of President Corazon Aquino was the full documentation and recovery of the illegally acquired assets of the Marcoses and cronies, and the prevention of their dissipation and transfer to other parties.
Three days after she took her oath as president at the historic Club Filipino in San Juan, Mrs. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 creating the PCGG as the quasi-judicial, collegial body tasked primarily to recover the illegally acquired wealth that accumulated during the dictatorship.
It was her first official act as president. She named Salonga as chair, and Ramon Diaz, Pedro Yap, Raul Daza and Mary Concepcion Bautista as commissioners.
EO 1 signaled to the world the political will of the new government to address the problems caused by the dictatorship.
With the national coffers emptied by the toppled dictator, Mrs. Aquino was then hoping that her government could recover a respectable portion of the illegal assets to provide social services for the Filipino people.
But this did not happen overnight.
No confiscation
Corazon Aquino, as the first post-EDSA Revolution president, declared her government as “revolutionary,” with her exercising the executive and legislative powers until a new constitution was put in place.
Governing under the temporary “Freedom Constitution” that later gave way to the 1987 Constitution, Mrs. Aquino was a virtual dictator during those days. But she chose not to be one.
The Aquino administration did not pursue immediate confiscations of suspected illegal assets. Broadly, Mrs. Aquino, through EO 1, gave PCGG the task to recover their ill-gotten wealth and take over or sequester business enterprises and entities they owned or controlled.
EO 1 also sought to adopt safeguards to avoid any repetition of large-scale corruption under her government and institute adequate measures to prevent any backsliding.
Second EO
Mrs. Aquino clarified her stand on the illegal wealth issue, when, on March 12, 1986, she issued Executive Order No. 2, which states that all claims on those illicit wealth and funds of the Marcoses and cronies should follow “the requirements of justice and due process.”
Clarifying the broad strokes of EO1, EO 2 said: “It is the position of the new democratic government that former President Marcos and his wife, Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees be afforded fair opportunity to contest these claims before appropriate Philippine authorities.”
EO 2 has led to the freezing of those assets and pieces of property of the Marcoses and cronies in the country, the prohibition of any person from transferring, conveying, encumbering or depleting or concealing those assets, and the requirement that persons holding those assets should make full disclosure to the PCGG.
Furthermore, EO 2 empowered the PCGG to make representations with foreign governments, where the illegal assets are based and appeal or request foreign governments to prevent their transfer, conveyance, encumbrance, concealment, or liquidation by the Marcoses and their ilk, pending the outcome of the investigations whether those assets were acquired by improper or illegal use of state funds.
Because of the two EOs, the PCGG had sequestered numerous assets and business enterprises suspected of being part of the illegal wealth of the Marcoses and cronies and, for business enterprises, placed fiscal agents to prevent their transfer and dissipation and ensure continuity of their operations until the settlement of the ownership issues.
Clashing views
Despite the marching orders, the PCGG was beset with controversies stemming from clashing views of its leaders on the implementation of the two presidential orders.
A faction believed to go all-out in the recovery efforts by sequestering those questionable assets and filing appropriate charges before the court. Constituting the hawks within the PCGG, they did not want to give any quarters to the dictator and his ilk.
But another faction felt it made better sense to negotiate with cronies for an out-of-court settlement. Court battles are messy; they take time before decisions are rendered. The prospect of out-of-court settlements, where Marcos cronies would return sizable amount of illegal assets in exchange for immunity from lawsuits, loomed as an option. (READ: Search for Marcos’ wealth: Compromising with cronies)
In the end, the Cory Aquino government adhered to the two approaches.
In most instances, the PCGG has filed court charges – criminal and civil – against the Marcoses and certain cronies.
But, in other instances, the government entered into out-of-court settlements, albeit selectively, with certain cronies.
It was the best of both worlds. But Amurao noted that quite a number of those court cases remain pending in various local courts.
In hindsight, Amurao said it would have been better for the PCGG to have immediately filed forfeiture proceedings on those suspected illegally acquired assets instead of going through the circuitous route of criminal and civil suits.
“The burden of proof would have been on the Marcoses and the cronies, not on the government,” Amurao said. “In forfeiture proceedings, they would be the ones who would explain the ownership issues.”
Botched attempts
Unconventional attempts were also conceived and considered to recover the secret Marcos bank deposits in Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Vanuatu, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, Monaco, Austria, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, United States, among others, and bring the funds back to the country.
Operation Big Bird, quietly conceived few months after the Marcos downfall, sought to recover the alleged $7.5 billion of secret bank deposits and assets scattered in various parts of the world. Banker Michael de Guzman was the prime mover of the scheme to withdraw the Marcos bank deposits and remit them to the Philippine government on one condition: a commission of a 20 percent from all recovered funds. (READ: What Bongbong Marcos knew of Swiss deposits)
De Guzman claimed that he had personal knowledge of those secret funds. No less than Marcos told him of those deposits when he met him in the Marcoses’ house in Honolulu in March, 1986. Marcos tapped him to withdraw their Swiss bank deposits after Swiss authorities froze their assets there.
De Guzman claimed that he met Marcos largely through the intercession of Col. Irwin Ver, son of Gen. Fabian Ver. At that time, Marcos was frantic because of the freeze order on their Swiss assets. Marcos issued the document giving him the power of attorney to withdraw those funds. He claimed to have gone to Switzerland thrice to withdraw those deposits, but he failed.
Because of his failure, de Guzman said he had decided to switch sides. He claimed to have networked with Victor Bou Dagher, a Lebanese national residing in Austria, who claimed to have connections with the European banking network. De Guzman and Dagher sought audience with retired Brig. Gen. Jose Almonte, who approved and joined the plan along with activist Charlie Avila.
Almonte later brought the scheme to Mrs. Aquino’s attention, but Salonga, in his capacity as PCGG chair, did not buy it, as he thought it could be a sting operation.
Then Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez rejected it upon learning that de Guzman wanted an advance of $250 million for the operations.
Operation Big Bird did not take off. But it had succeeded to bring to the attention of the international community the unbelievable magnitude of the Marcos loot abroad.
Operation Big Bird was not the last scheme of its kind. In 1991, Operation Domino became public, as its proponent, Rainier Jacobi, an Australian national, claimed he had identified after 12 years of sleuthing the alleged Marcos gold bullions worth $13.2 billion hidden and deposited in a warehouse in Kloten Airport in Switzerland and secret Swiss bank deposits of $14 billion under the name of Irene Marcos Araneta, the youngest of the three Marcos children.
Just like de Guzman, Jacobi said he intended to work for their recovery and return on one condition: a 10 percent commission. But the PCGG did not take Jacobi seriously. It viewed de Guzman and Jacobi as a pair of treasure hunters, whose hunt could be more of a miss than a hit.
Drastic moves
The PCGG took the country by surprise when, in 1986, it sequestered 263 firms and shareholdings of 146 other firms, and assigned a number of fiscal agents and volunteers to prevent the dissipation and transfer of resources in the sequestered firms. But the PCGG dismissed over the next two years a number of erring fiscal agents and volunteers.
The PCGG likewise took custody of the identified local Marcos assets, including the jewelry collection the Marcoses hurriedly left in Malacañang, filed the first 39 civil cases for the recovery of the Marcos assets, and recovered P157 million ($3.3 million) in cash dividends from Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corp. (POTC) and Philcomsat, two sequestered firms.
It was also in 1986 when the PCGG, showing political will to recover Marcos assets in foreign countries, worked on two most difficult issues of the entire recovery efforts: the recovery of the Marcos bank deposits in Switzerland and the criminal prosecution of the Marcoses.
The PCGG filed with Switzerland a request for legal assistance to recover the identified Marcos Swiss deposits of $340 million at that time. In the absence of any bilateral treaty on treatment of illegal wealth deposited in Swiss banks, the PCGG relied on the provisions of the International Mutual Assistance on Criminal Matters Act (IMAC) as its legal bases.
The IMAC, also called mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT), is a pact between two or more countries for the purpose of gathering and exchanging information mainly to enforce public laws or criminal laws.
The Swiss government froze the Marcos assets there, but it was in 1987 when the Swiss Supreme Court, in an unprecedented decision, upheld the Philippine claim on the Marcos deposits and agreed to lift the banking secrecy on these deposits. The lifting enabled the PCGG to identify other Marcos deposits, raising the total of Marcos deposits to $658 million after 25 years.
What the Swiss Supreme Court did was a breakthrough.
It was the first time that the Swiss government gave way to claims on illegal wealth of dictators. The Swiss government had reacted to widespread perceptions that the country’s banking system, enjoying iron clad guarantees for the secrecy of their deposits, had become a haven for dictators.
Imelda’s acquittal
It was also in the turbulent 1986, when the PCGG filed criminal charges against the Marcoses in the US District Court for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or the RICO Act. It accused the Marcoses of racketeering, as they converted the Philippine government machinery into a virtual criminal organization geared to plunder the country of its resources.
The court trial involved only former first lady Imelda Marcos; husband Ferdinand died in 1989. It had its drama, but the jury acquitted her in 1992 in what was a major setback for the recovery efforts. Her acquittal enabled the exiled former first lady to return to the country.
The PCGG likewise secured in 1986 from the New Jersey Supreme Court the award of titles to two Marcos assets in New Jersey: the Princeton Pike property, which the PCGG sold in 1987 for an amount equivalent to P34.6 million (around $727,000), and the Pendleton Drive property.
Moreover, the PCGG filed a $200 million claim in 1986 on four New York buildings that constituted the hidden assets of the Marcoses there: Crown Building; Herald Center on the 34th and 6th Avenues; 200 Madison Avenue; and 40 Wall Street on the 57th and 5th Avenues. The New York City Federal Court responded by freezing those four New York assets.
The PCGG found out quite belatedly that the four New York buildings were heavily mortgaged. When sold to private parties, the proceeds the government received were quite measly when compared to the original claim of $200 million. The Herald Center was sold in 1989 for $25 million, but only $1.5 million went to the government due to heavy mortgages.
The 40 Wall Street (Trump Building) property was sold in 1989 in a foreclosure sale of $3.25 million. The Crown Building was sold in 1991 for $93.6 million, but only $769,852 went back to the government because of heavy mortgages.
The PCGG recovered only $189,149 from the sale of 200 Madison Avenue property. The PCGG received the equivalent of P58.3 million ($1.2 million) from the sale of Olympic Tower, a New York property, which was not included in the original list of 4 New York assets.
